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Abstract
In this essay we’ll prove Gödel’s incompleteness theorems twice. First, we’ll prove them the good old-fashioned
way. Then we’ll repeat the feat in the setting of computation. In the process we’ll discover that Gödel’s work,
rightly viewed, needs to be split into two parts: the transport of computation into the arena of arithmetic on
the one hand and the actual incompleteness theorems on the other. After we’re done there will be cake.
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that
we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by
extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them. Operations of thought
are like cavalry charges in a battle—they are strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be made
at decisive moments.
Alfred North Whitehead
All possible strings
Axioms
Provable
True but undecidable
G
Disprovable
False but undecidable
¬G
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1 The Incompleteness Theorems On Fast-Forward
Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are clearly the most significant results in the history of mathematics (fight
me). The first establishes that no single “proper” formal system can fully settle all mathematical questions; that
truth and provability are distinct concepts.1 The second shows that such a formal system also can’t prove itself
free of contradiction. If it tries, its wings will melt and it will crash to the ground.
Gödel accomplished these triumphs as follows. Suppose we’re given a formal system2 F that is capable of reasoning
about elementary arithmetic. Then, as Gödel showed through a lot of toil [1], it is possible to construct a sentence
G which essentially says “I am not provable in F ”. Once he had built this sentence he then simply asked: can G be
proven or disproven—that is decided—in F?
Suppose G is provable:
Either ¬G is also provable:
⇒ Both G and ¬G are provable in F . Any system in which such a situation arises is also called inconsistent.
Or ¬G isn’t provable:
⇒ Since G is provable there exists some concrete proof of G which we can write out inside F . This is done
using a device called Gödel numbering which allows numbers to talk about proofs. It’s complicated.
⇒ Because this proof leads to G this allows us to construct a new proof of «G is provable» = ¬G.3 But
we’re assuming ¬G isn’t provable. We have arrived at a genuine contradiction, not just an inconsistency.
So this can’t happen. We’ll use the shorthand “” for this in the future.
Suppose ¬G is provable:
This is what it means to disprove G. But beware: ¬G isn’t a self-referential sentence. In particular, it’s not
equal to «¬G isn’t provable». Instead, it’s «G is provable». These are very different sentences. ¬G is really more
like an evil twin that’s telling lies about its sibling (assuming the system F as a whole is honest). Furthermore,
mind the fact that this case and the previous aren’t logical opposites. That’s where I use either/or.
Either G is also provable:
⇒ F is inconsistent.
Or G isn’t provable:
⇒ Since ¬G is provable there exists some concrete proof of ¬G which we can write out inside F .
⇒ But in order to force a contradiction we’ll have to find a proof of G = «G isn’t provable», not «¬G is
provable» (uh-oh).
⇒ We can’t find a proof of G despite the fact that its existence is exactly what ¬G = «G is provable»
asserts.
⇒ We haven’t convicted F of an outright inconsistency. But something is still very, very wrong with it.
These deductions, as well as the ones in the proofs to follow, are deliberately written in such a painstaking style in
order to make the similarities between the first and second set of proofs as plain as possible. These are the decisive
moments of our battle.
Now, it would be nice to say that we’ve proven that, if our formal system F is consistent, then G is undecidable.
Unfortunately our second case wasn’t strong enough. So, just as Gödel did in 1931, we’ll have to settle for a weaker
formulation:
Theorem 1 (First Incompleteness Theorem—Original Version). Let F be an honest4 formal system
capable of reasoning about elementary arithmetic. Then F is incomplete; it contains a sentence that can
neither be proven nor disproven in F .
Proof. We just did that.
Okay, I pulled a fast one there. Crucially, I skipped over a rather important concept: honesty. What exactly do I
mean by that?
1Note to the veteran reader: this entire presentation is focused on the standard interpretation of arithmetic. No funky transfinite
numbers.
2For the purpose of this discussion every formal system is effectively axiomatized by definition. This basically just boils down to the
fact that proofs are computer checkable.
3Whereas regular quotes (“ ”) perform their usual function, guillemets (« ») surround formal sentences denoted by their English
description. Also “=” doesn’t always have to mean exact equality. I also use it to relate sentences which are merely logically equivalent,
provided this is obvious.
4The traditional term is “sound”. But when explaining this concept to my mother I had to admit that “honesty” is much more fitting.
Also, I’ve been burned by overloaded usage of the term “soundness” in the past.
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As the name suggests, an honest formal system is a formal system that speaks the truth. We can believe the
claims it makes. In particular, if our F is honest and proves ¬G = «G is provable», then, just as ¬G says, it really
is the case that G is provable. This is how we can force a contradiction out of the second case.
But honesty is a stronger assumption than consistency. An honest formal system is always consistent. After all,
an inconsistent formal system contains a sentence S such that both S and ¬S is provable. One of these must be
a lie. However, a consistent formal system isn’t necessarily honest. Here’s a completely hypothetical example to
illustrate:
Imagine I’m the leader of an idyllic communist utopia. Everything is going according to current five-year plan.
Except one day a nuclear reactor of mine suddenly catches fire. If I then go on to tell the world community that
there’s nothing to worry about, this will merely be a lie, not a contradiction. Even once Swedish scientists begin
smelling the fire my excuses, while fabricated, can still retain their internal consistency. It’s only when I finally
confess to my mishap that I contradict myself. At that point I have given two directly contradictory accounts. Now
even those without a Geiger counter can tell that I’ve been dishonest.
Disorienting as it may be, this dishonest-yet-consistent state can also occur in formal systems. Most important
for our purposes, it is conceivable that F can prove ¬G = «G is provable» while G in fact isn’t provable. This
would lead to a curious situation I’ll call sub-inconsistency5 where for all n ∈ N the sentence
«G doesn’t have a proof shorter than n»
can be proven in F by just going through all possible proofs up to length n and pointing out that none of them do
the trick. Yet the sentence with the “for all” on the inside,
«G doesn’t have a proof shorter than n for all n ∈ N» = G,
is not only unprovable but flat out contradicted by ¬G. This is why Gödel had to assume honesty (or at least
super-consistency) in his original proof. Basically, he had to press F up against the wall and shout: “No games,
dammit!”
Okay, but isn’t there a less violent way to prevent this kind of sub-terfuge? Indeed there is. In 1936 J. Barkley
Rosser found a way [2] to demonstrate the improved
Theorem 2 (First Incompleteness Theorem—Rosser’s Version). Let F be a consistent formal system
capable of reasoning about elementary arithmetic. Then F is incomplete.
Proof. In hindsight Rosser’s trick is quite simple. Instead of formalizing “I am not provable” he formalized the
sentence “For every proof of me there exists a shorter disproof”. Let’s refer to this sentence as R and see how R
can help us.
Suppose R is provable:
⇒ There exists some shortest proof p of R.
Either there is a proof of ¬R that’s shorter than p:
⇒ F is inconsistent. 6
Or there isn’t:
⇒ We can go through all strings shorter than p and determine that none of them are a proof of ¬R.
⇒ We can write out this list inside F and point out that all longer strings are at least as long as p.
⇒ This allows us to construct a new (longer) proof of «There exists a proof of R with no shorter disproof
(namely p)» = ¬R.
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
Suppose ¬R is provable:
⇒ There exists some shortest proof p of ¬R.
Either there is a proof of R that’s shorter than p:
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
Or there isn’t:
⇒ We can go through all strings shorter than p and determine that none of them are a proof of R.
⇒ We can write out this list inside F and point out that all longer strings are at least as long as p.
⇒ This allows us to construct a new (longer) proof of «For every proof of R there exists a shorter disproof
(namely p)» = R.
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
5Also known under the name “ω-inconsistency”. Let’s spare our horses.
6Inconsistencies can be promoted to genuine contradictions if they collide with the assumption of consistency.
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Whereas Gödel’s original proof was limping on one leg, Rosser’s version is perfectly balanced, as all things should
be, yielding the stronger result.
Finally, there’s one more summit to conquer in this mathematical Himalaya. That’s the Second Incompleteness
Theorem.
Theorem 3 (Second Incompleteness Theorem). Again, let F be a consistent formal system capable of
reasoning about elementary arithmetic. Then F can’t prove its own consistency.
Perhaps the fact that this theorem speaks of consistency, not honesty, makes you a little suspicious. Is this
another one of Rosser’s upgrades? No. For the Second Incompleteness Theorem Gödel only needed half of his First
Incompleteness Theorem. And, as luck would have it, this was exactly the half that spoke of consistency.
Proof. Let’s assume for the purpose of contradiction that F can prove its own consistency
⇒ The first half of the proof for the First Incompleteness Theorem can be read as a proof by contradiction that
if F is consistent, then G isn’t provable.
⇒ Using the fact that «G isn’t provable» = G this can be stated more concisely as “F is consistent =⇒ G”.
⇒ As Gödel himself pointed out with some hand-waving, there wasn’t actually anything in the reasoning we
used to prove this that we couldn’t carry out just as well in F . So «F is consistent =⇒ G» is actually a
theorem in F .
⇒ We’re assuming that F can prove «F is consistent». So by modus ponens7 F can also prove G.
⇒ But G can’t be proven. 
Moral of the story: if you declare yourself a very stable genius, you’re not [3].
2 The Rise Of The Machines
We now come to the dramatic turn in our story. Namely, we’re about to demand that our formal system F can
reason about algorithms, not just elementary arithmetic. And then we’ll reprove all three of the previous results
on top of that.
What could possibly provoke such heresy? Well, you may recall that in the prequel we relied quite heavily on the
fact that both G and R could somehow be constructed in F . But we never actually performed these constructions.
We also liberally made assertions of the form: “we can list out all proofs up to length n inside F ”. But F is about
numbers, not formal sentences. How is all of this ultimately accomplished?
The reality is that I hand-waved these details for a reason. They are non-trivial in the extreme (ideal exercises
for the reader!). That’s because, from a modern perspective, Gödel basically had to teach programming to formal
systems that were about arithmetic. And he had to do it half a decade before the first models of computation were
even devised. This is where all the tough technical work had to be done. The incompleteness theorems themselves
were mere victory laps at the end.
This delimitation between the different parts of Gödel’s work is frequently passed over without comment but
will become even more apparent as we move on. In fact, setting the record straight on this matter is really the
main point of this essay. By placing computation—for example in the form of Turing machines—directly into the
bedrock of our formal system our task will become orders of magnitude simpler. Gödel had to scale a vertical cliff
to convince his peers that “p is a proof of S” could be expressed within the confines of arithmetic. We, on the other
hand, aided by the ski lift built by Turing and his apostles, can see at a glance that the same could be checked by
a computer. Let’s exploit that.
Anybody who still harbors a nostalgic longing for “elementary arithmetic” can then take on the separate task of
showing how to ponder computation in the realm of the natural numbers. Perhaps one can also study computation
starting from a different base camp such as knot theory. Who knows? (I’m completely clueless regarding knot
theory.) Meanwhile, we will have the incompleteness theorems above the clouds all to ourselves.
3 To Halt Or Not To Halt
Alright, here we go. The only ingredient we need to prepare is the unsolvability of the Halting Problem due to Alan
Turing in 1936 [4].
7Modus ponens is the inference rule that from A and «A =⇒ B» follows B.
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Lemma 1 (Unsolvability Of The Halting Problem). There’s no algorithm that implements the function
A 7→
{
accept if A(A) halts
reject if A(A) doesn’t halt.
(“A(A)” denotes an algorithm A running on its own source code.)
Proof. Suppose H solves the Halting Problem. Then one could create the following algorithm:
H(A)
if H(A) rejects
halt
if H(A) accepts
loop
“halt” just. . . halts. We don’t even need to bother accepting or rejecting. It doesn’t matter. And “loop” is a simple
infinite loop without exits. Now, question: does H(H) halt?
Either H(H) halts:
⇒ H(H) accepts.
⇒ H(H) doesn’t halt. 
Or H(H) doesn’t halt:
⇒ H(H) rejects.
⇒ H(H) halts. 
Either way we get a contradiction.
Easy peasy. As you’d expect of a mere lemma. We’re now ready for the First Incompleteness Theorem.
Theorem 4 (First Incompleteness Theorem—Original Version By Computation). Let F be an
honest Turing complete formal system. Then F is incomplete.
For a formal system to be Turing complete simply means that it can reason about algorithms. And our arguments
won’t be overly technical anyway. So let me just leave it there.
Proof. Suppose F was complete. Then we could solve the Halting Problem using the following algorithm:
H(A)
for x ∈ all possible strings8
if x proves «A(A) doesn’t halt»
reject
if x proves «A(A) halts»
accept
Because F is complete this search will eventually hit upon a proof of either «A(A) halts» or «A(A) doesn’t halt».
And because F is honest we’ll be able to trust its judgment. That determines whether or not A(A) halts. But, as
we saw only a moment ago, it’s impossible to solve the Halting Problem. So F couldn’t have been complete. 
That certainly went by a lot faster than my last reading of Gödel, Escher, Bach [5]. Though, if you’ve ever had
the incompleteness theorems explained to you by a computer scientist, then you probably saw this proof coming a
mile away. And for good reason. It’s a very elegant little proof; deserving of its popularity.
4 Welcome To The World Of Mirrors
Nevertheless, this isn’t the proof I want to use going forward. The reasons are threefold:
• The jump from honesty to consistency is rather tricky.
• The Second Incompleteness Theorem doesn’t follow naturally at all.
• The parallels to Gödel’s and Rosser’s original proofs are lost. (This one’s the biggie.)
We can do better. Watch this:
8In case it wasn’t clear: we’re iterating in lexicographical order. This procedure is sometimes also jokingly referred to as the British
Museum algorithm because it’s akin to using chimps in front of typewriters in an attempt to reproduce all the books in the British
Museum.
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Second Proof Of Theorem 4. Consider the following algorithm:
P (A)
for x ∈ all possible strings
if x proves «A(A) doesn’t halt»
halt
I now claim that «P (P ) doesn’t halt» is undecidable in F . Let’s call this sentence
∞
G because it’s the perfect
analogue of Gödel’s G. The critical new feature of
∞
G is that its construction has become just a small matter of
programming. If we go through the alternatives, we find:
Suppose
∞
G is provable:
Either ¬
∞
G is also provable:
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
Or ¬
∞
G isn’t provable:
⇒ Since
∞
G is provable P (P ) will eventually find such a proof after some sequence of steps which we can
write out inside F .
⇒ Because this sequence leads to a terminal state this allows us to construct a new proof of «P (P ) halts»
= ¬
∞
G. 
Suppose ¬
∞
G is provable:
Either
∞
G is also provable:
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
Or
∞
G isn’t provable:
⇒ Since ¬
∞
G is provable P (P ) will eventually find such a proof after some sequence of steps which we can
write out inside F .
⇒ But in order to halt P (P ) will have to find a proof of
∞
G = «P (P ) doesn’t halt», not ¬
∞
G (uh-oh).
⇒ P (P ) doesn’t halt despite the fact that this is exactly what ¬
∞
G = «P (P ) halts» asserts.
⇒ F is dishonest. 
Is anybody else experiencing déjà vu? Note that, whereas in the previous proof we only established the existence
of undecidable sentences in F , here we actually have a concrete undecidable sentence on our hands. And we didn’t
even need the Halting Problem!
Moreover, almost miraculously, the two cases for
∞
G’s provability run into the exact same problems as G. In
the first case F plants its Face squarely in inconsistency. In the second one the precise correlation between the
information F communicated and the facts insofar as they can be determined and demonstrated is such as to cause
epistemological problems of sufficient magnitude as to lay upon the logical and semantic resources of the English
language a heavier burden than they can reasonably be expected to bear. It told a lie [6].
Upon closer inspection we notice that we’re even dealing with the same kind of lie:
sub-inconsistency
After all, if
∞
G isn’t provable, then one can still prove that P (P ) hasn’t halted after n steps for all n ∈ N by just
writing out n steps of the computation in F and noting that it’s still running. But the summarizing sentence «P (P )
hasn’t halted after n steps for all n ∈ N» =
∞
G is mysteriously unprovable. If F then goes on to prove ¬
∞
G = «P (P )
halts», this will be a false promise. Yet we’re unable to catch it red-handed.
And if you thought that was neat, just wait until you see Rosser’s trick. As you may recall, this one worked by
patching the asymmetry between the two cases in Gödel’s original argument. Let’s see what happens if we try the
same here.
Theorem 5 (First Incompleteness Theorem—Rosser’s Version By Computation). Let F be a con-
sistent Turing complete formal system. Then F is incomplete.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm:
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B(A)9
for x ∈ all possible strings
if x proves «A(A) doesn’t halt»
halt
if x proves «A(A) halts»
loop
In a sense we’ve seen this algorithm before. Just take H as it’s defined in the first proof of Theorem 4, substitute
it into H , and simplify. It’s F ’s most valiant attempt to implement H . This time our undecidable sentence is (you
guessed it)
∞
R = «B(B) doesn’t halt».
Suppose
∞
R is provable:
⇒ There exists some shortest proof p of
∞
R.
Either there is a proof of ¬
∞
R that’s shorter than p:
⇒ F is inconsistent. 10
Or there isn’t:
⇒ B(B) will go through all strings shorter than p and determine that none of them are a proof of ¬
∞
R.
⇒ We can write out this computation inside F and point out that B(B) will then find p and enter a terminal
state.
⇒ This allows us to construct a new (longer) proof of «B(B) halts» = ¬
∞
R.
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
Suppose ¬
∞
R is provable:
⇒ There exists some shortest proof p of ¬
∞
R.
Either there is a proof of
∞
R that’s shorter than p:
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
Or there isn’t:
⇒ B(B) will go through all strings shorter than p and determine that none of them are a proof of
∞
R.
⇒ We can write out this computation inside F and point out that B(B) will then find p and enter an
infinite loop.11
⇒ This allows us to construct a new (longer) proof of «B(B) doesn’t halt» =
∞
R.
⇒ F is inconsistent. 
I feel like I’m watching a reboot (in more than one sense). We can even recognize the phenomenon of finding
either shorter or longer disproofs and proofs; pure satisfaction.
Alright, time for the grand finale.
Theorem 6 (Second Incompleteness Theorem—By Computation). One last time, let F be a consistent
Turing complete formal system. Then F can’t prove its own consistency.
We could continue using B for the Second Incompleteness Theorem. But that would be ugly. Gödel didn’t need
Rosser’s help for his proof. Neither shall we.
Proof. Let’s assume for the purpose of contradiction that F can prove its own consistency
⇒ The first half of our new proof for the First Incompleteness Theorem can be read as a proof by contradiction
that if F is consistent, then P (P ) doesn’t halt.
⇒ Using the fact that «P (P ) doesn’t halt» =
∞
G this can be stated more concisely as “F is consistent =⇒
∞
G”.
⇒ Now we simply observe (with some faith) that there wasn’t actually anything in the reasoning we used to
prove this that we couldn’t carry out just as well in F . So «F is consistent =⇒
∞
G» is actually a theorem in
F .
⇒ We’re assuming that F can prove «F is consistent». So by modus ponens F can also prove
∞
G.
⇒ But then P (P ) will eventually find such a proof and halt. 
9I picked the names P and B because there’s a slight visual resemblance between the letters and the programs they denote. (Also
this is why I placed the “doesn’t halt” case first.)
10I might add that in this case B(B) never reaches p but finds the shorter proof first. We could dwell on this. But we already have
an inconsistency which is all we need.
11Proving that a program runs forever raises the specter ( ) of sub-inconsistency. But rest assured. Any formal system capable of
reasoning about algorithms can prove that “while true do nothing” runs forever. Otherwise it ought to be ashamed of itself.
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5 Taking Off The Glasses
At this point I can’t even tell the difference between the classical approach and the algorithmic retelling anymore.
Can you? All these proofs are exactly the same as before! In fact, the relation is so strong that I was able to write
the latter ones by copy-pasting wholesale and then tinkering a little. Just line them up and see for yourself. Every
single line matches. Clearly, this can’t be coincidence. There must be a deeper reason for this overabundance of
similarities. And there is. Perhaps you’ve already caught on long ago. Or perhaps Clark Kent’s glasses fooled you
too. Drum whirl please.
Recall once more what
∞
G says. It says “P (P ) doesn’t halt”. But P (P ) isn’t just executing some simple infinite
loop. It’s looking for something. It’s scouring the proofs in F for a proof of «P (P ) doesn’t halt» =
∞
G.
∞
G’s claim
that P (P ) will never find a proof of
∞
G is echoing G’s claim that the original computers, you and me, will never find
a proof of G. In other words,
∞
G is also proclaiming to the world:
“I am not provable!”
Exercise: Take off
∞
R’s glasses as well.
This means I could’ve organized this presentation very differently. I could’ve just made these observations right
away and then said: “Now reread the first section. ”. I’ve been wasting your time!
6 Refactoring The Incompleteness Theorems
Gödel was programming the integers. That is that. And he didn’t even know it at the time; truly impressive. I
think this feat deserves to be encapsulated with its own theorem. Perhaps we can come together and save posterity
from the grim fate of also only realizing this much later in their lives. It’s for the kids—and for the horses.
Theorem 7. Elementary arithmetic is a Turing complete domain.
I’ll have to leave the exact formulation of this theorem to smarter people. After all, I did recently score in the
bottom 7% of the GRE’s analytical writing section (come on!). The upshot is that this allows us to easily recover
the incompleteness theorems for elementary arithmetic from a more general insight:
Theorem 8 (Turing Incompleteness Theorem). Any consistent formal system F capable of reasoning
about a Turing complete domain can reason about algorithms. That makes F a consistent Turing complete
formal system. Thereby, the incompleteness theorems apply to it. In slogan form:
If it’s complete, then it’s incomplete.
Proof. I think the idea is best conveyed with an example. Take the famously Turing complete Game of Life. For any
algorithm one can create a configuration in the Game of Life which mimics that algorithm. Now suppose somebody
came up with a formal system F to reason about the Game of Life. This formal system might be able to prove
assertions such as: «Starting with a configuration of the form [. . . ] square (0, 0) will never be occupied».
The incompleteness theorems are now immediate. All we have to do is to encode the algorithms P and B into
a Game of Life configuration and reiterate the previous arguments. Conclusion: F will never be able to decide
whether the encoding of B “halts”. And it won’t be able to prove its own consistency.
As a consequence computational undecidability and logical undecidability go hand in hand. And elementary
arithmetic is just one further entry in the long list containing the Game of Life, Fractran, Post Tag Systems,
Magic the Gathering, the human brain, Rule 110, the Lambda Calculus, musical notation, . . .
(Thank you so much for your attention! The cake I promised in the abstract is on its way. Please stand by.)
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